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THE DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE RULINGS
EARL G. THOMPSON*
The Internal Revenue Service has disclosed to the public
approximately 45,000 pages of the previously unavailable In-
ternal Revenue Manual,' a document prepared for IRS agents.
The disclosure was due in part to the Freedom of Information
Act (hereinafter F.O.I.A.);2 partly as a result of court order in
Long v. Internal Revenue Service' and Hawkes v. Internal Rev-
enue Service,4 and partly as an incident of the first Tax Ana-
lysts and Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service case5 (herein-
after Tax Analysts 1). In 1974 as a result of still further litiga-
tion,6 the Treasury Library indexing system began to make
available to the public correspondence and memoranda of con-
versations and telephone calls of the Office of Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury relating to proposed legislation. Additional
information inundation appears imminent.
The result of Revenue Commissioner Alexander's plan for
future disclosure of letter rulings7 would be thousands of pages
of new tax opinions annually, dwarfing the popular 7,000 page
version of the Internal Revenue Manual. Further, the result of
the recent order of a federal district court in the second Tax
Analysts and Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service case'
* B.A. 1964, Yale University; J.D. 1967, Harvard Law School; member New York
Bar; research consultant to Bar subcommittee on New York gift tax.
1. In Long v. Internal Revenue Service, 349 F. Supp. 871, 874 (W.D. Wash. 1972)
the court stated:
The Manual guides agents in negotiating with the public and promotes uniform-
ity by detailing information and instructions pertaining to the processing and
technical aspects involved in the drafting, processing, reviewing, and signing of
closing agreements ....
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967) [hereinafter cited as F.O.I.A.].
3. 339 F. Supp. 1266 (W.D. Wash. 1971), 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
4. 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
5. 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Tax Analysts I]. See generally, Caplin, Taxpayer
Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, 20 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAXATiON 1 (1962).
6. Tax Reform Research Group v. Internal Revenue Service, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9374,
74-2 U.S.T.C. 9483 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. Hearings on Disclosure Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted at
B.N.A. Daily Tax Reporter, July 31, 1974, J-1.
8. Civil No. 75-650 (D.D.C. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Tax Analysts IM].
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(hereinafter Tax Analysts II), stayed until the Supreme Court
acts in Internal Revenue Service v. Fruehauf,9 would be the
implementation of a plan disclosing an estimated 160,000 letter
rulings, 300,000 index cards, and other related documents. 0
The order will go into effect upon a reasonably unqualified
affirmance of the circuit court opinion. Unless the Internal
Revenue Service pursues other means of delay, all the letter
rulings of the Excise Tax Branch will be disclosed.
Tax Analysts I was a successful action to obtain access to
specific unpublished letter rulings from the Mining and Tim-
ber Section of the Internal Revenue Service." Tax Analysts II
was a declaratory judgment action seeking the disclosure of all
unpublished rulings and related documents. 2
The impact upon the legal fray between skilled representa-
tives of the public and the formidable litigators representing
the Internal Revenue Service will be great. The consequences
of the proposed disclosure upon tax professionals will be
equally significant in that as many as 480 printed volumes
could become available. Will disclosure be an unmixed blessing
or an awesome "double-edged sword" inflicting wounds on
each adversary?
As will be seen, evidence already exists to provide partial
guidance in organizing and answering the questions the
thoughtful tax practitioner may ask. Will the new information
be useful as legal precedent, prior history or as sophisticated
technical information in areas not covered by case law or other
available law? Is this sudden disclosure of a body of legal and
technical knowledge of such scope and significance truly un-
precedented or does the legal scholar have some historical guid-
ance to assist him? Other matters to be considered are: the
manner of disclosure; the ability of research facilities of the
legal profession to absorb massive raw legal material; the prob-
able role of industrial associations in assembling rulings of in-
terest to their respective members; and the ability of computer
9. 75-2 U.S.T.C. 16,189 (D.D.C. 1975), cert. granted, - U.S., 96 S.Ct. 772
(1976).
10. See Tax Analysts II, Civil No. 75-650 (D.D.C. 1975). See generally Comment,
Public Disclosure of Internal Revenue Service Private Letter Rulings, 4 U. CHI. L. REv.
832 (1973).
11. 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
12. Civil No. 75-650 (D.D.C. 1975).
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research systems to aid in information assimilation. Will dis-
closure reveal Internal Revenue Service inconsistencies and
abuses? Which biases may we reasonably expect to see re-
flected on the basis of information we now have? What will be
the effect of revealed abuses upon the Internal Revenue Service
itself? Which of several courses open to the Internal Revenue
Service might be followed if disclosure is required: prospective
revocation, for which precedent exists, declaration of obsoles-
cence or unwillingness to give precedential weight. Is the be-
lieved inappropriateness of the Service's attempt to impose
secrecy matched by a corresponding inappropriate excess zeal
of the public to achieve too much disclosure?
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF DISCLOSURE
A. A Description of Private Letter Rulings and Technical
Advice Memoranda
The current F.O.I.A. litigation conveniently elicits the
Service's view of the nature, function and precedent-setting
value of private rulings and technical advice memoranda. The
focus of that consideration is to distinguish whether the writ-
ings constitute "interpretations . . . adopted by the agency,"
within the meaning of section 552(a)(2) of the F.O.I.A. 3 and,
if so, whether the writings are exempt from disclosure as in-
come tax returns under Internal Revenue Code section
6103(a)(1)" as well as under other exempting provisions. An
analysis of these issues will not fully interpret the impact of
disclosure upon tax lawyers but will serve as an excellent start-
ing point.
Treasury Regulation section 601.201 (a) (2) has defined a let-
ter ruling as:
A written statement issued to a taxpayer or his authorized
representative by the national office which interprets and
applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts."
A letter ruling is written by the Office of Assistant Commis-
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967). See also Uretz, Freedom of Information and the IRS, 20
ARK. L. REV. 283 (1967) and Hoerster, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act-Early
Judicial Interpretations, 44 WASH. L. REv. 641 (1969).
14. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6103(a)(1). See also Sexton, New Law Changes Rules
on What Information IRS Must Disclose; Confusion Likely, J. oF TAXATION 120 (1967)
and Davis, The InformationAct: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHi. L. Rav. 761 (1967).
. 15. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(2) (1976); see also Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 C.B. 698.
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sioner, Technical. Usually sought by the taxpayer in advance
of a contemplated transaction, its function is to advise the
taxpayer regarding the tax treatment he can expect in the cir-
cumstances specified in the ruling. Public disclosure is not
made of the ruling, and no one other than the taxpayer is
entitled to rely upon such a ruling." Attachment of the ruling
to the taxpayer's return is advised. 7
A technical advise memorandum is similar to a letter ruling
but legally more sophisticated. It is not issued directly to a
taxpayer; it is a response to a district director's request for
instructions as to the treatment of a specific set of facts relating
to a named taxpayer. 18 The director's question may arise during
an audit examination or the processing and consideration of a
claim for refund. 9 The taxpayer ordinarily accepts the oppor-
tunity to assist in drafting the request for technical advice and
receives the substantive portion of the memorandum written in
response.2 0
If the Internal Revenue Service considers the memorandum
or ruling to have no significant "reference" value, it places the
document in an historical file, alphabetically by the taxpayer's
name, and maintains the file without a separate index for four
years. Other private rulings and technical advice memoranda
deemed to have a continuing reference value for internal pur-
poses are placed in a permanent reference file, along with court
decisions, published revenue rulings and other material
deemed to have similar continuing reference value. This file is
organized by Internal Revenue Code section number and an
"index digest" card file is maintained. The card file offers cita-
tions to the main reference file and usually summarizes the
contents of the reference file.2
B. Rulings and Advice as Secret Law
Whether technical advice and private rulings constitute a
body of "secret law" depends in part upon the meaning at-
16. Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 C.B. 698, § 13.01. See also Kragen, The Private Rul-
ing-An Anomaly of Our Internal Revenue System, 45 TAXES 331 (1972).
17. Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 C.B. 698, § 6.14.
18. Treas. Reg. § 601.105(b)(5) (1976) et seq., Rev. Proc. 69-2, 1969-1 C.B. 386,
superceded by Rev. Proc. 72-2, 1972-1 C.B. 695.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Tax Analysts I, 362 F. Supp. at 1302.
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tached to the phrase. Without resorting to abstruse distinc-
tions, it is possible to make some pertinent observations. First,
private rulings and technical advice memoranda are interpre-
tations of one of the most complex, most contested and most
researched areas of the law known. Second, the law as inter-
preted has an immediate monetary effect upon the parties in-
volved. Third, the Supreme Court has stated that private rul-
ings "do reveal the interpretations put upon the statute by the
agency charged with the responsibility of administering the
revenue laws. 2 2 Other courts have expressly or implicitly la-
beled these writings a "form of law." In Cuneo v. Schlesinger,
the court stated:
It is well established that information which either creates or
provides a way of determining the extent of substantive rights
and liabilities constitutes a form of law . . . "secret law"
(citations omitted) .21
It is, accordingly, difficult to imagine a more elaborate body of
secret, unavailable law than will be unveiled if the Internal
Revenue Service is required to make its private rulings avail-
able to public scrutiny.
The jurisprudential uniqueness of the situation presented to
the tax profession is itself a cause for wonderment. Ironies
abound. In theory an administrative agency guards its freedom
of action by avoiding the creation of precedent. Ironically, the
complexity of the federal tax law required precedent-conducive
written rulings, indicating begrudgingly the position the Serv-
ice will take if the taxpayer engages in a particular course of
action.
To create a body of law to assist individuals and then to
keep it secret is antithetical. Any law is ineffective unless pub-
licized, particularly where the subject matter is highly com-
plex. While historical examples of secret courts come to mind,
such as the Court of Star Chamber, no examples of secret law
accompany them. Secrecy enshrouded their actions but not
their deliberative processes. If the preceding comments are well
taken, what conclusions follow? Perhaps it can be said, cau-
tiously, that some tension will always exist where law-like or
precedent-like attributes are introduced into an administrative
22. Hanover Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 369 U.S. 672, 686 (1962).
23. 484 F.2d 1086, 1091, n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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agency's functions. This tension has apparently resulted in an
attempt by the federal tax administration to turn a zebra into
a horse with grey paint. Through no real choice of its own, the
Service has created a hybrid form of law, declared the hybrid
characteristics to be nonexistent and then implemented this
edict through secrecy and precedent-disavowal. Kenneth Culp
Davis stated that precedent-giving status is denied to private
rulings in order to reduce taxpayer dissatisfaction with the lack
of publication.24 Revenue Commissioner Caplin noted in 1962
that only published rulings are subject to pre-publication
''searching review" by the Service while seventy-eight percent
of private rulings are issued at the branch level and will not be
so reviewed.2
C. Disclosure and the Revelation of Inconsistency and Abuse
Before considering the impact and possible uses of private
rulings, we may make some tentative hypotheses. Sinister
governmental-administrative motives are least served by the
creation of a body of precedent. Usable precedent coming from
the release of private rulings will not of itself elicit patterns of
abuse; but, analysis of Service inconsistencies may reveal
abuses.2 1 Consistent patterns of prejudice may appear, as in the
favoring of larger business or other taxpaying entities with bet-
ter legal counsel, but this is a form of prejudice known well in
conventional case law! The most likely abuse to appear is the
possible selection for publication during the pre-disclosure
years of only those rulings most favorable to the administrative
positions of the Internal Revenue Service, and the ignoring of
those private rulings which display the taxpayer's position
most advantageously.
D. Disclosure and the Increase of Uniformity
The current introductory statement in the Cumulative Bul-
letin disavows reliance by the Internal Revenue Service on any
"unpublished ruling or decision." This is tantamount to a
declaration that tax officials will not strive for consistency. The
24. K. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 4.10 (1970 Supp.).
25. Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement
of Principles, 20 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 1 (1962).
26. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 4.10 (1970 Supp.).
27. Introduction, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. iii.
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Internal Revenue Service can maximize consistency and uni-
formity by relying on its own precedents, and the likelihood of
reliance is increased by disclosure.
E. Disclosure May Accelerate Legislation of Ruling Appeal
Procedure
Revenue rulings on proposed transactions qualify as decla-
ratory orders"8 and ought to be subject to judicial review. How-
ever, with the exception of the Employees Retirement Income
Security Act's procedure for the accelerated review of qualified
plan status determinations, 9 no form of proceeding is now
available." This inadequacy in the federal tax law will be un-
derscored when private rulings become generally available and
a legislative solution may be precipitated.
F. Uses of Private Rulings
1. Private Rulings as Precedent
As noted in the current F.O.I.A. litigation, letter rulings
and technical advice memoranda are incontestably "interpre-
tations" of Internal Revenue Service policy, but not necessarily
"precedent," even for the limited purposes of policy determina-
tion. While admitting that as interpretations the writings
apply the tax laws "to a specific set of facts, 3 1 the Service
contended that since prior private rulings are never cited or
relied upon in the preparations of new agency determinations,
they are not "precedents." After passage of the F.O.I.A., the
Internal Revenue Service became suddenly aware of the differ-
ence between "precedent" and "knowledge." The Service labo-
riously re-stamped "reference" in place of "precedent" on files
occupying over two thousand linear feet of shelf space.
The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, in Tax Analysts I, found it necessary to cite little more
than BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY to rebut the Service's position
having first observed:
1. A private ruling is placed in the "reference" file rather
28. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 4.10 (1970 Supp.).
29. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7476.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1959), the Declaratory Judgment Act, excludes tax cases from
its purview.
31. Tax Analysts I, 362 F. Supp. at 1303.
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than the "routine" file if it has future significant reference
value because of the issues involved.
2. Classification as "reference" enables IRS personnel to
refer to such rulings to find underlying authorities and rea-
soning when they are preparing an unpublished letter ruling
or even a ruling to be published with a similar issue.
3. If the underlying authorities have not changed and the
facts are the same, a new ruling will probably hold the same
as the old "reference" ruling.
4. If someone does a good piece of research work and reaches
a conclusion that is very well supported, that research is valu-
able as a reference or research tool because the goal is uni-
formity and correctness.
5. The IRS has at least once expressly relied on unpublished
rulings in tax litigation.
6. The only difference between the use of earlier rulings by
the IRS and earlier decisions by the courts is that the IRS
never cites earlier private rulings in later ones.32
The court concluded:
[Tihe plain and established meaning of the word leads to
the conclusion that in the operational pattern set forth above
the IRS "research tool" is in fact "precedent." That a ruling
is relied upon does not necessarily mean that it will be slav-
ishly followed, for precedent is often only persuasive rather
than controlling. Nor does reliance mean that the official
decision maker is not free to reverse itself or overrule prior
decisions if necessary. Just as within the Court system, the
highest responsible authority within the agency is not bound
to follow a "precedent" which on thorough examination he
concludes is ill-founded or no longer appropriate. The record
indicates that if a previously issued private letter ruling on a
similar situation is called to the attention of the IRS in for-
mulating a newly requested ruling the prior ruling will be
regarded as most persuasive, if not dispositive (footnotes
omitted) .3
2. Court Recognition of Private Rulings
As administrative rather than judicial determinations, pri-
vate rulings have jurisprudential vitality; they are meaningful
and sophisticated interpretations of law, sometimes the only
32. Id. at 1305-06.
33. Id. at 1306.
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source of a significant legal doctrine. 4 Courts have uniformly
disregarded published Internal Revenue Service Rulings, and
presumably would treat private rulings similarly, as constitut-
ing no more than the statement of the position of the Service.
While this disregard is proper in certain circumstances, it
is not axiomatic. To a court there is legal relevancy to any
rational, consciously reasoned and response-oriented pro-
nouncement of the Internal Revenue Service. The door to judi-
cial relevance is at least opened to introduce pronouncements
of the Service in the nature of admissions against interest,
unrevoked public espousal of a position contrary to the stance
taken before the court, and acquiescence to prior court deci-
sions favorable to the taxpayer's position. In United States
Thermo Control v. United States, private rulings relied upon
by the Internal Revenue Service were held inconsistent with
published rulings.
In at least four areas, courts should not disregard private
rulings:
1. Where it is of evidentiary interest, factual rather
than legal, to know the Service's position on the issue;
2. Where highly technical private rulings are the best
available learning on a point of law or fact interpreta-
tion, in which case they should at least have the value
of a treatise;
3. In tax litigation between private parties where the
Service is not an adversary but the liabilities of the
parties depend upon an interpretation of tax law; and
4. In tax fraud litigation where the intent of the tax-
payer can be affected by his reading of private rulings.
3. Private Rulings Can Help Interpret Published Rulings
In some instances, private rulings can shed light upon the
intent of the Internal Revenue Service in issuing a related pub-
lished ruling. The earlier unpublished version, like legislation
modified during deliberation, offers the researcher the hope of
discovering additional evidence of administrative intent with
the benefit of the history of the published ruling. Unlike legisla-
tive history, private rulings are not acknowledged to be or oth-
34. Id.
35. 372 F.2d 964 (Ct. C1. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967).
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erwise identified as a predecessor to published rulings, but
there is reason to believe that they would be so identified in the
future. Prior to disclosure, the tax practitioner has the triple
research task of first, finding unpublished rulings on the same
subject matter as the published ruling in question; second,
determining from the treatment of the subject matter whether
the prior ruling may have served as a starting point for the later
ruling; and third, attempting to determine the meaning and
usefulness of comparisons of the earlier and later versions.
In August of 1975 the Service issued Revenue Ruling 75-
308,36 stating that the date a life insurance reserve is increased
in size is not the date of authorization by its board of directors
if the newly increased reserve is not shown on the company
statements until substantially later. The Service made a simi-
lar ruling in response to a technical advice request dated May
31, 1966, 3 the sentence and paragraph structure of which had
similarities to the published ruling. It was clear from each rul-
ing that the board of directors' action alone did not establish
the newly increased reserves, but different emphasis can be
discerned as to the reason board approval was not the determi-
native event. Revenue Ruling 75-308 stated that:
Neither the adoption of a resolution by the board of trustees
authorizing reserve strengthening nor the accompanying au-
thorization to transfer funds from surplus to accommodate
the reserve strengthening as the contracts matured is deter-
minative of the taxable year in which a change in basis in
computing reserves has occurred for purposes of section
810(d)(1). Neither action constitutes the final event neces-
sary to satisfy section 1.818-2 (c) of the regulations (emphasis
added) .38
The private ruling dated May 31, 1966 stated at a similar point
in its reasoning:
When X's board of trustees adopted the resolution in 1947 to
change the basis for computing reserves on the Optional De-
ferred Income Contracts as they matured, all of the events
had not occurred which would determine the amount of the
liability with reasonable accuracy. Therefore, the change in
basis in computing the reserves is deemed to have occurred
36. Cum. Bull. Rev. Rul. 75-308, 1975 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 30 at 14.
37. See Appendix.
38. Cum. Bull. Rev. Rul. 75-308, 1975 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 30 at 15.
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in the taxable year in which the reserves were first computed
on the new basis (emphasis added)."'
The revenue ruling emphasized absence of a "final event"
while the private ruling implied lack of accuracy in determina-
tion as the sole obstacle to the "all events" tests. Read together
the two rulings provide the serious researcher with new in-
sights.
The Internal Revenue Service had attempted to remove a
confusing fact element appearing in the private ruling in order
to make the published ruling more readable. In the private
ruling, the taxpayer may have added to its reserves in stages
over the ten years between the board resolution and the year
determined by the Service to be the actual year of reserve
strengthening. It was necessary in the private ruling to respond
to these facts by stating that:
For the period 1942 through 1957, it was not necessary for a
life insurance company to determine its individual reserve
requirements for Federal income tax purposes .... 1o
By contrast, the revenue ruling clarified this by stating that the
company, for the first time in 1971, "determined and added
amounts to the reserves that matured in that year."4 Seen as
an attempt to improve clarity, the changed fact circumstance
is a justifiable use of an administrative prerogative. Seen as a
compromise of the presumed authenticity of the fact situations
underlying even published rulings, the change is less justifia-
ble. The persuasive force of a published ruling emanates from
two sources: the announced determination of the Service to act
pursuant to the ruling and, equally important, the belief of the
tax practitioner that the Service has acted at least once in a
real situation. Revenue ruling 75-308 suffered somewhat as an
effective administrative device in this respect. Its simplication
resulted in a fact situation most knowledgeable tax practition-
ers found artificial. When the revenue ruling is compared to the
1967 private ruling involving believable facts, the meaning of
the published ruling becomes more credible. As set forth in the
private ruling, a board of trustees might well have authorized
reserve strengthening in 1947 and then taken no implementing
39. See Appendix.
40. Id.
41. Cum. Bull. Rev. Rul. 75-308, 1975 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 30 at 14.
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action until 1957, the year of a significant federal income tax
change. According to the revenue ruling, the board took action
in 1954 and then delayed implementation until 1971. It is diffi-
cult to relate this fact situation to any real board of directors.
The 1967 private ruling stated that it was not contended
that the contracts in question were supplementary contracts.
42
The revenue ruling was silent on that point, but elaborately
detailed the board's reasons for strengthening reserves. 4 3 In so
doing, the revenue ruling attempted to avoid possible confusion
between the ruling's facts and the facts of a 1973 case, Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.44 If
obliquely applicable, the case would counter the thrust of the
public ruling. While the issue in that case is unnecessary to
describe here, it is significant that the Service further compro-
mised the truth-relatedness of the fact situation, not only for
simplicity of statement, but also to respond to an issue cur-
rently in litigation.
To summarize, the comparison of the public and private
ruling disclosed that:
1. Private rulings are informative as to the meaning of
public rulings to the extent that they expand upon their mean-
ing or provide additional illustrations;
2. Private rulings demonstrate that public rulings have
eliminated unnecessary factual complications, unrelated to the
basic thrust of the public ruling;
3. Private rulings demonstrate that the Service actively
attempts to color fact situations with respect to which the Serv-
ice has actually ruled in composing a public ruling, selecting
only those fact situations favorable to the positions the Service
is advocating; and,
4. Private rulings may occasionally reinforce the related
public ruling by showing that the less than likely fact situation
of the published ruling adequately demonstrates a legal theory
or position taken by the Service in an actual case whose facts
differed from the public ruling.
A word of realism is in order. Counsel to the average tax-
payer cannot expect to find a specific private ruling elucidating
each published ruling governing his case, but many such
42. See Appendix.
43. Cum. Bull. Rev. Rul. 75-308, 1975 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 30 at 14.
44. 488 F.2d 1101 (3rd Cir. 1973).
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predecessor-type private rulings will be found if disclosure,
when it materializes, includes supporting documents.
4. Private Rulings and Their Relationship to Other Private
Rulings
Private rulings can reinforce or detract from the
persuasiveness of the conclusions of other private rulings. The
existence of a ruling on a given subject matter tells the tax
researcher that others are likely to exist, as it constitutes prima
facie evidence of the Service's willingness to rule. This knowl-
edge is important to the tax planner who otherwise is confined
to study of official ruling guidelines to determine whether his
ruling request will meet with any response. Unlike an authori-
tative case, which due to its clarity and force may eliminate
other litigation, an authoritative private ruling does not act to
reduce the number of other ruling requests.
The following analysis of four related private rulings issued
to the same taxpayer will reveal that related subject matter
rulings can be mutually illuminating in much the same way as
related cases.45
The first pair responded to a request placed on April 4, 1961
and a request for further consideration dated August 24, 1965.
Each related to the question of whether interest paid to the
United States Civil Service Commission on a Federal Employ-
ees Health Benefits Act contingency insurance fund was inter-
est or a less advantageous dividend. The other pair responded
to a request dated March 21, 1962 and a request for amplifica-
tion dated August 8, 1962. The subject matter was the dividend
or interest characterization of payments made to the United
States Civil Service Commission under a different insurance
coverage, Federal Employees Group Life Insurance.
Each of the four is carefully reasoned and highly technical.
The second of each pair refers to the two-stage history of the
ruling request, incorporating relevant facts previously set forth
by reference; interestingly enough, a superficial exception to
the Service's recent contention that no private ruling contains
a reference to another private ruling.48 No cross references are
made between the pairs of rulings. The two 1962 rulings re-
45. The private rulings discussed are ones with which the author is personally
familiar.
46. Tax Analysts I, 362 F. Supp. at 1303.
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sulted in somewhat more favorable tax treatment than the
other pair of rulings. Nevertheless, the four read together could
be found mutually consistent. In the absence of litigation on
the question, they would undoubtedly be the best available
evidence of the proper income tax treatment of the technical
issue involved.
5. Disclosure Could Be Orderly and In Usable Form
Several reasons exist for anticipating that disclosure will
not be of massive, unusable material. Existing indexing proce-
dures organize the "reference value" rulings by Internal Reve-
nue Code section. The Tax Analysts II order was for implemen-
tation of a procedure for disclosure, which hopefully will re-
quire a reasonable indexing procedure extending to rulings not
now in the index file. Revenue Commissioner Alexander's July
31, 1974 disclosure announcement to the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure" would: (1) limit dis-
closure to prospective rulings, thus making better organization
possible for what is disclosed; and (2) not include "mandatory"
rulings forced upon the taxpayer as under sections 367 and 1492
of the Code or technical advice memoranda, further reducing
the extent of the inundation of information. The Service's re-
quest for comments in August, 1974 on the manner of disclo-
sure might be seen as indicating concern that disclosed mate-
rial be usable.48 The 1974 F.O.I.A. Amendments49 furthermore
strengthen the requirement that agencies publish indexes of
material required to be disclosed by that paragraph.
Should the Internal Revenue Service be required to make
private rulings available, a year or more may pass before the
major services organize and publish them in whole or in part.
Computerized research organizations have not been positively
shown to have any advantage over conventional tax research
and publication services in dealing with material of this magni-
tude. On the other hand, computer systems may eventually do
an excellent job of assisting research into private rulings. In the
initial race to enjoy the newly available "secret law" of private
47. Hearings on Disclosure Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted at
B.N.A. Daily Tax Reporter, July 31, 1974.
48. See IRS News Release, IR-1409, 8-9-74, reprinted in P-H Federal Taxes 55,
359 (1974).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1974).
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rulings, it is reasonable to expect that industry organizations
and trade associations will attempt to segregate those rulings
applicable to their members and provide some form of organi-
zation. Indeed, one court has stated the belief that private
letter rulings are already widely disseminated among the tax
bar and taxpayers with similar difficulties, and that only the
general public has been denied access to the information." This
unrestrained statement from the bench may not be entirely
true, but it is true that previously well organized parties with
similar interests, such as the real estate industry, have been
organizing what private rulings its members have been willing
to share and would be well prepared to rise to the occasion of
full private ruling disclosure.
6. Disavowal of Private Ruling Holdings by the Service
Should Not Impair Their Value
It is not unprecedented for tax authorities to revoke prior
written rulings en masse. The State of Missouri Department of
Revenue withdrew all written and verbal rulings on Missouri
sales tax given prior to January 1, 1973 effective February 28,
1975, and required all taxpayers to resubmit ruling requests in
writing.5' The Internal Revenue Service could attempt to make
a similar blanket withdrawal.2 When a ruling is revoked for
cause, the burden of persuasion falls upon the taxpayer to jus-
tify the correctness of the desired tax treatment granted by the
ruling. Were the Internal Revenue Service to take such drastic
action in an attempt to stem the rush toward review and analy-
sis of embarrassing rulings, the disavowal would be disturbing
to the taxpayer, but actually meaningless unless the Service
truly intended to reappraise its existing rulings. Whether a firm
prospective declaration of obsolescense is a practical alterna-
tive or not, the interest of the public in letter rulings and their
persuasive value resulting from internal logic should not signif-
icantly change. Ultimately, the Internal Revenue Service is in
no better position to disavow its rulings, absent a true change
in its stance, than a court of law is able to disavow its collective
prior decisions.
50. Tax Analysts I, 362 F. Supp. at 1309.
51. Information Bulletin, Dept. of Revenue Section (Mo. 1974).
52. See Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A State-
ment of Principles, 20 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 1 (1962).
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Nevertheless, the Service may well announce that it will
treat fully researched and fully reviewed private rulings as im-
bued with greater precedential value than any not fully re-
searched and reviewed prior to issuance. Hopefully, the percen-
tage of fully reviewed rulings will increase from the twenty-two
percent estimate of Mortimer Caplin in 196211 to one-hundred
percent. The persuasive value of rulings would increase if all
were given full review.
I. THE DISADVANTAGES OF DISCLOSURE
The disadvantages of disclosure to the tax professional are
implied in the foregoing statement of advantages. Will existing
library space house the added volumes? Will the number of
rulings be so great that their existence and availability become
meaningless? Will they be so inconsistent as to be unusable?
Disclosure may not result in administrative reform but only
decreased administrative morale and the institution of new
methods of ruling concealment, such as increased use of the
oral opinion. Implied in the preceding discussion of uses of
private rulings is the possibility that they may be poor preced-
ent if precedent at all, and the courts' recognition of private
rulings may be the exception proving the rule that they cannot
be pressed as legal authority.
Disclosure may be far from orderly, given the uncertainty
that the Service even has the manpower to meet the minimum
requirements of disclosure. The following specific areas of con-
cern may be particularly costly to the health of the profession.
A. Increasing Disparity of Service for Taxpayers of Varying
Means
While the information explosion increases the possible serv-
ice the professional can offer his client, costs will increase as
well. Disclosure could mean that only taxpayers with great
means could authorize counsel to review all available material.
Among taxpaying business entities, the largest will continue to
be able to justify researching every source. Those previously on
the threshold of being able to afford proper representaion will
not. This disparity in the ability to offer proper service will
subject the profession to accusations of serving only the
53. Id.
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wealthy and powerful, an accusation which has been heard
before.
B. Fewer Future Rulings
Another cost of disclosure will be fewer, more limited rul-
ings involving longer ruling time, which is a consequence the
already overburdened business community cannot afford.
Longer ruling time was suggested by Assistant Commissioner
Gibbs in the context of a proposed ruling procedure requiring
waiver of the taxpayer's right to nondisclosure." A reduction in
the number and scope of rulings and restriction of the circum-
stances in which ruling requests will be granted appears inevi-
table, absent an increase in Service staff, if the Service intends
to provide proper review to assure absence of uneven treat-
ment. Presumably, more ruling requests will be accompanied
by taxpayer briefs pointing out the existence of previous simi-
lar rulings, and each will require more processing time.
C. Reactionary Legislation
On September 11, 1974 the Treasury submitted a legislative
proposal to amend Internal Revenue Code sections 4102, 6103,
7213, 7513 and related provisions. The bill would reverse Tax
Analysts I and Tax Analysts II as they deal with past letter
rulings, correspondence and indexes and would place within
the Treasury's discretion future letter ruling disclosure. The
proposal would also eliminate some previously existing rights
of shareholders to corporation tax return information. The re-
sults of this proposal would be a net decrease in information.
Technical advice memoranda would not be disclosed at all.
The bill makes returns and return information confidential
with an exception from this characterization for private letter
rulings requested after a certain date. The bill makes current
Treasury Regulations under section 6103 part of the statute.
These regulations expanded the definition of tax "return" and
would have supported the Treasury's defense in Tax Analysts
I had they not been declared partially void as being of broader
scope than the statute. The bill would repeal the rule allowing
a one percent shareholder of a corporation to obtain its tax
return information.
54. Hearings on Disclosure Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted at
B.N.A. Daily Tax Reporter, July 31, 1974.
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
D. Private Rulings Not Easily Readable
For several reasons, research into private rulings will be
more difficult than research into published rulings, especially
if the material is not in printed form. First of all, private rulings
are often longer than published rulings. The facts contained in
the letter requesting the ruling are usually outlined in the rul-
ing letter with incorporation by reference to the full description
in the taxpayer's letter. Both letters may refer to exhibits and
be difficult to understand without analysis of exhibits. Sec-
ondly, private ruling letters, not intended for widespread read-
ing, sacrifice readability in favor of exactness. Multiple re-
quests within a letter are common. Issues are organized solely
on the basis of the internal logic of the request letter and not
on the basis of usefulness to the tax bar generally.
E. Disagreement Within the Internal Revenue Service On
Persuasive Weight of Particular Rulings
Upon occasion the Service demonstrates internal disagree-
ment as to the merits of a particular ruling, contrary to the
administrative rule that the district offices follow national of-
fice directives. This phenomenon appeared in the refusal of one
or more district offices to even discuss the internal logic of a
significant private ruling relating to the treatment of warrants,
even though the ruling has gained prominence from its publica-
tion in a widely read Service treatise. 5 If acute disagreement
can arise from a now widely read private ruling, how does the
tax practitioner assess the persuasive value of more obscure
rulings?
F. Disclosure Can Impair the Vitality of the Internal Revenue
Service Deliberative Process
If the public and tax bar believe that the persuasive logic
of case-by-case ruling decisions is in the nature of case law,
some interest should be taken in preserving those desired quali-
ties. To place seemingly unrestricted disclosure demands upon
the Service may introduce an imbalance into the ruling pro-
cess. Is it possible, ultimately, for every internal memorandum
or conversation to be disclosed in the ruling process and for a
ruling process to survive in the form we know? Will excessive
55. See Knickerbocker, Walker and Levy, 246 T.M., Life Ins. Companies-Taxable
Income, B.N.A., 1971 at B-61.
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public access to supporting documents of disclosable private
rulings destroy some of the freedom necessary to the
deliberative process?
II. CONCLUSION
It is possible to err in desiring too much information. In any
event, a wise practitioner can attempt to prepare himself to
make reasonable use of the information should it become avail-
able. Among the adverse consequences of disclosure above out-
lined, those most pernicious to business are longer ruling time,
fewer future rulings, loss of confidentiality and possible trade
secret exposure. Materialization of these alleged horrors may,
however, be a self-fulfilling Internal Revenue Service prophecy,
avoidable if only the F.O.I.A. litigation leads to an amicable,
rather than a hostile, resolution. Similarly, whether disclosure
results in more uniform administration of the tax laws on the
one hand or in reactionary administrative practices and coun-
terproductive Treasury-sponsored legislation depends upon
whether court mandated disclosure results in cooperation or
resistance.
It is therefore with optimism that we may view Chief Coun-
sel Meade Whitaker's contention that the Service views the
problem "as not whether ruling letters should, as a matter of
policy, be disclosed, but rather how, when and pursuant to
what authority. . .. ,,51 Narrowing the gap between the disclo-
sure demanded in Tax Analysts II and that palatable to the
Internal Revenue Service is proposed new Internal Revenue
Code section 6110, drafted in late 1975 by the Service, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the House
Ways and Means Legislative Counsel and the Joint Congres-
sional Committee staff. The proposed rule would provide for
publication of letter rulings and technical advice memoranda
issued subsequent to July 4, 1967.11 In this healthier climate of
cooperation, it is reasonable to hope that disclosure's ill side
effects can be minimized.
56. Whitaker, Ruling Letters and Technical Advice, The Disclosure Crossroads, 53
TAXES 712, 714 (1975).
57. Id. at 716. All post July 4, 1967 letter rulings and technical advice memoranda
would be made public, but not be considered precedents. No exceptions would be made
for mandatory rulings. Elaborate provisions for the deletion of confidential references
and identification of taxpayers are made, as well as slightly different rules for account-





Requested May 31, 1966
This is in reply to your request for technical advice whether
the increases in reserves claimed by the X Life Insurance Com-
pany (hereinafter called X) under section 809(d) and 810(b)
and (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are due to a
change in the basis for computing reserves and, therefore, re-
quire the proration of the deductions for such increases over
each of the succeeding ten taxable years in accordance with
section 810(d)(1) of the Code.
The facts presented indicate that X is a life insurance com-
pany within the meaning of section 801 of the Code and is
subject to the tax imposed by section 802 of the Code. X issues
a so-called "Optional Deferred Income Contract" which pro-
vides a retirement annuity or benefits under several optional
methods of settlement upon maturity of the contract. If the
policy holder dies before the contract matures, his estate or
beneficiary receives a payment approximately equal to the
total amount of the premiums paid.
When these contracts were issued, it was anticipated that
the maturity value would be sufficient to provide the benefits
guaranteed. In 1947, however, X's board of trustees decided
that the reserves for matured contracts should be strengthened
and thereby put on a basis different from the basis used in
computing the reserves when the contracts were issued. There-
fore, the board of trustees adopted a formula for a change of
basis to be effected as the contracts matured.
For the taxable years (sic) consideration, X determined the
amount of the reserves on the contracts which matured in each
of those years in accordance with the formula adopted by its
board of trustees in 1947. The full amount of the resulting
increase in reserves was deducted by X on each of its tax re-
turns for the years 1958 through 1961.
X does not contend that the matured contracts are supple-
mentary contracts, rather, it contends that a new basis for
computing reserves with respect to these contracts was deter-
mined by its board of trustees in a resolution adopted in the
year prior to the taxable years involved. In the taxable years
involved, all that occurred was a change in the status of the
contracts, that is, from "before maturity" to "after maturity."
Therefore, it is argued, the deduction for the increases in re-
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serves should be allowed in full in the letter dated March 2,
1966, that if the increases in reserves do represent changes in
the basis for determining reserves in the years involved, then
it should be entitled to a deduction for 1958 for 1/10 of the
increase in such reserves determined in 1948, with similar
treatment for increases in reserves determined in the years 1949
through 1957.
Section 809(d)(2) of the Code allows a deduction for the net
increase in reserves required by section 810 to be taken into
account (quotation of Section 810(d)(1) of the Code omitted).
Section 1.810-3(b) of the Income Tax Regulations sets forth
the following example in illustration of the provisions of section
810(d) (1) of the Code: (illustration omitted).
Section 1.818-2(c) of the regulations states, in part, that
under an accrual method of accounting, a change in the basis
or method of computing the amount of liability of any item
referred to in section 810(c) occurs in the taxable year in which
all the events have occurred and, in which, the amount thereof
(whether increased or decreased) can be determined with rea-
sonable accuracy.
Senate Report No. 291, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Sec-
tion, C.B. 1959-2, 770 at 794, states, in part, as follows: (quote
omitted).
Thus, the intent of Congress in the enactment of section
810(d) (1) of the Code was directed to the taxable year in which
a change in the basis of reserves on the strengthened basis is
actually computed.
When X's Board of Trustees adopted the resolution in 1947
to change the basis for computing reserves on the Optional
Deferred Income Contracts as they matured, all of the events
had not occurred which would determine the amount of the
liability with reasonable accuracy. Therefore, the change of
basis in computing the reserves is deemed to have occurred in
the taxable year in which the reserves were first computed in
accordance with the new basis.
Accordingly, it is held that X changed its basis for comput-
ing reserves with respect to its Optional Deferred Income Con-
tracts, within the meaning of section 810(d)(1) of the Code, in
each taxable year in which the reserves were computed on the
new basis and is, therefore, required to prorate the deduction




With respect to X's alternative position, the Life Insurance
Company Income Tax Act of 1959, Public Law 86-69, C.B.
1959-2, 654, which added the provisions of section 810 of the
Code, applies only to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1957, with certain exceptions not material here. For the
period 1942 through 1957 life insurance companies were taxed
only on their net investment income over and above a deduc-
tion computed under various formulas. Thus, for the period
1942 through 1957, it was not necessary for a life insurance
company to determine its individual reserve requirements for
Federal income tax purposes.
Beginning with January 1, 1958, reserve liability of a life
insurance company was required to be determined on an indi-
vidual company basis. Therefore, 1958 is the first taxable year
to which the provisions of section 810(d)(1) of the Code can be
applied. Consequently, X is not entitled to a deduction in 1958
for 1/10 of the increase in reserves determined in 1948; nor is it
entitled to similar deductions for increases in reserves deter-
mined in the years 1949 through 1957.
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